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THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE SECTION 7 CONCERTED
ACTIVITY: A LITERAL DEFINITION EMERGES
The National Labor Relations Act' (the Act) governs the rights of
employers and employees in the employment relationship. 2 Section 7 of the
Act grants employees the rights to form and join labor unions, to bargain
collectively and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.3 Generally, the
National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB or Board) and the courts agree
that concerted activity means a group of employees acting together to
register work-related complaints.4 A conflict that is causing inconsistency
between the Board and the federal courts, however, is whether the Act
protects an individual employee's action in light of the "concerted activity"
language in section 7 of the Act.5 The Board and the courts frequently have
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). Congress created the National Labor Relations Board
(the Board) in §§3-6 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). See 29 U.S.C. §§153-56
(1982) (discussing creation of NLRB). The Board is an administrative agency that enforces the
provisions of the Act and oversees the election procedures of the Board. Id. §§ 158-59. See
also generally Bethel, Constructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals
from the Court and the Board, 59 INDm L.J. 583, 583 n.I (1984) (hereinafter Bethel, Constructive
Concerted Activity) (discussing functions of National Labor Relations Board).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (policy and purpose of National Labor Relations Act is to
enhance employment relationship between employee and employer); see also International Ass'n
of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 428 (1960) (policy of Act is adjustment and compromise
of competing interests of labor and management); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d
147, 155 (6th Cir. 1969) (purpose of Act is to promote peace within labor - management
relationship); Gatciff Coal Co. v. Cox, 152 F.2d 52, 56 n.2 (6th Cir. 1945) (policy of Act is
to encourage friendly negotiation of industrial disputes).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)
provides that employees have the right to self-organize, to form or join labor unions, and to
engage in collective bargaining and "in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection". Id. Section 7 also provides employees the right
to refrain from joining in collective bargaining or other concerted activities unless required as
a condition of employment. Id. Section 8(a) of the Act specifically forbids an employer from
interfering with the rights of employees under section 7 of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
4. See infra note 21 and accompanying text (illustrating court and Board decisions that
have held that concerted activity exists when group of employees act together).
5. See, e.g., City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 465 U.S. 822, 841 (1985) (individual
employee's attempts to enforce collective bargaining agreement is concerted activity); Meyers
Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1138 (1986) (individual
employee must act with or on behalf of fellow employees to seek protection as § 7 concerted
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struggled with the interpretation of concerted activities under section 7 of
the Act.6 Because the legislature did not define the term "concerted activity"
in the Act, the NLRB and the courts have rendered inconsistent decisions
regarding a definition of concerted activities.7 The Board, however, in
Meyers Industries, Inc.8, recently held that an individual employee's activ-
ities, absent some form of interaction with fellow employees, will not
constitute concerted activity for the purposes of section 7 of the Act. 9
Congress established the rights embodied in section 7 to place employees
on equal ground with their employers. 0 According to the United States
Supreme Court, section 7 rights are so basic and important to the labor
relationship that the Court has labeled the rights fundamental." If the
employer has interfered with, restrained, or coerced an employee in the
exercise of his section 7 rights, the employer has committed an unfair labor
activity); Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975) (individual employee's invocation
of statutory right affecting all employees constitutes concerted activity within § 7); Interboro
Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966) (individual employee's enforcement of
collective bargaining agreement is protected concerted activity), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d
Cir. 1967).
6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing conflict of courts and Board to
define concerted activity within § 7 of Act); see also Mak, City Disposal Systems and the
Interboro Doctrine: The Evolution of the Requirement of "Concerted Activity" Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 2 HorsTA LAB. L.J. 265, 265 (1985) (NLRB and courts have
trouble deciding specific activities that § 7 protects).
7. See, e.g., Aro, Inc., v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979) (section 7 protects
employee activity only when employee acts on behalf of other employees, regardless of existence
of collective bargaining agreement); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 221
(8th Cir. 1970) (individual employee's complaints regarding collective bargaining agreement
constitute protected concerted activity within § 7); Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d
683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (concerted activity exists when individual employee acts for purpose
of inducing group activity). In addition to the inconsistent decisions of the federal circuit
courts regarding the definition of concerted activity within section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board also has rendered varying opinions. See,
e.g., Mannington Mills, 272 N.L.R.B. 176, 176-77 (1984) (concerted activity is not present if
individual employee complains to management without support of fellow employees even when
complaints address common concern of fellow employees); Air Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B.
1064, 1064 (1977) (individual employee's complaints constitute concerted activity within § 7 if
complaints are matter of common concern to fellow employees); King Soopers, Inc., 222
N.L.R.B. 1011, 1018 (1976) (concerted activity exists when individual employee invokes right
contained in collective bargaining agreement); Traylor Pamco, 154 N.L.R.B. 380, 388 (1965)
(similar but separate complaints of individual employees do not constitute concerted activity
if employees did not consult with each other regarding complaints).
8. 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137 (1986).
9. See Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1142 (1986)
(section 7 of Act does not protect purely individual employee activity).
10. See City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984) (Congress enacted
§ 7 of Act to equalize bargaining power of employee with that of employer).
11. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61
(1975) (section 7 rights are most basic rights involved in industrial self-determination); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (right of employees to self-organize for
purposes of collective bargaining and other mutual protection without employer's interference
or restraint is fundamental right).
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practice under section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2 A violation of section 8(a)(1)
usually occurs when an employer discharges an employee because the
employee has engaged in protected concerted activities or collective bargain-
ing. 3 The Act, however, will not protect all the activities of an employee.
14
If the employee's activity is unrelated to employment, is unlawful, or the
activity consists of mere personal complaints, section 7 will not protect the
employee from discharge."5 In addition, section 7 will not protect employee
activities if the employer has no knowledge that section 7 protects the
specific activity of the employee.16 An employer, however, does not violate
12. See 29 U.S.C. §158 (1982) (employer commits unfair labor practice if employer
violates employee's §7 rights).
13. Id. Section 8(a)(l) of the National Labor Relations Act states in part that an
employee commits an unfair labor practice if the employer fires an employee for engaging in
concerted activity or collective bargaining. Id.
14. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing employee activities that § 7
does not protect).
15. See, e.g., Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 48 (1942) (mutiny of sit-down
strikers in violation of federal criminal code was unlawful, unprotected activity); Puerto Rico
Food Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 153, 155 (Ist Cir. 1980) (complaints unrelated to
working conditions do not constitute concerted activity); Tabernacle Community Hosp. &
Health Center, 233 N.L.R.B. 1425, 1428 (1977) (NLRB held that employee's complaint
regarding transfer was personal and unprotected by § 7 of Act); Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 135
N.L.R.B. 936, 938 (1962) (individual complaint regarding salary is not concerted activity),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 310 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1962). See generally Finkin &
Gormon, The Individual and the Requirement of 'Concert' Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 286, 290 (1981) (prevailing principle of law endorsed by courts of
appeals and NLRB is that § 7 does not apply to personal complaints of single employees).
In Puerto Rico Foods Prods. Corp., employees staged a concerted work stoppage,
protesting management's discharge of a supervisor. Puerto Rico Foods Prods. Corp v. NLRB,
619 F.2d at 154-55. The Circuit held that section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act) does not protect the employees' activity because the activity did not relate to employment
conditions. Id. at 157. The First Circuit in Puerto Rico Foods, thus held that the employee's
discharge was lawful. Id.
In Tabernacle Community Hosp. & Health Center, the employee protested to management
regarding management's refusal to transfer the employee to a different department. Tabernacle
Community Hosp. & Health Center, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1427. The Board held that the employee's
complaints and protests were merely personal complaints, and section 7 of the Act, therefore,
did not protect the employee's activity. Id. at 1428.
In Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., an employee complained to management, alleging that
management did not pay to the employee the correct salary for the employee's truck haul.
Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. at 937. The Board found that the employee's complaint
did not arise from concerted activity, but merely was a personal complaint that section 7 of
the Act did not protect. Id. at 938.
16. See NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964) (section 7 protection
requires that employer recognize that employee's activities are concerted and protected when
employer discharges employee for that activity); NLRB v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d
838, 840 (2d Cir. 1953) (employer must know that employee's activity is protected by § 7 for
discharge to be unlawful under Act). See generally Mak, supra note 6, at 266. (unfair labor
practice occurs if employer knowingly interferes with employee's protected rights and discharges
employee because employee was exercising protected rights). Id.
In NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc, the Supreme Court first recognized the requirement
1987] 1279
1280 WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
section 8(a)(1) when the employer discharges the employee for cause re-
gardless of whether the employee engaged in concerted activity or collective
bargaining. 17 In order to decide, therefore, whether an employer has com-
mitted an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the courts
and the Board first determine whether certain employee activity falls within
the protective boundaries of section 7 of the Act."
A literal reading of section 7 of the Act suggests that section 7 protects
employees who act in concert with each other.' 9 The concept of concerted
activities within the meaning of section 7 protects a broad range of employee
activities, including complaints regarding wages, working conditions and
racial discrimination in the work environment. 20 The Board and the courts
agree that section 7 provides protection to employees when the employee
action involves more than one employee and the activity consists of legiti-
mate labor-related complaints regarding wages, working conditions and
racial discrimination. 2' Section 7, however, is silent regarding the protection
that an employer must have knowledge of an employee's protected rights See NLRB V. Burnup
& Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964) (violation of § 8(a) requires that employer know that
employee is engaged in activity protected by § 7). The Supreme Court stated that the employee
must be engaged in protected concerted activity at the time of discharge, that the employer
must know that section 7 protects the employee's activity, and finally, that the employer discharged
the employee because the employee engaged in the protected concerted activity. Id.
17. See, e.g., NLRB v. Superior Co., 199 F.2d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1952) (Board does not
interfere with normal exercise of employer's right to hire or discharge employees for any
reason other than legal involvement in union activities); Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v.
NLRB, 93 F. 2d 985, 989 (4th Cir. 1938) (section 7 does not regulate employer's control in
business regarding employment, promotion, or discharge of employees when employer is not
interfering with employees' right to organize); Klate Hoh Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 1606, 1612 (1966)
(if employee provides to employer sufficient cause for discharge and employer discharges
employee for that cause, discharge is not unlawful under § 8(a)(1)).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982) (employer violates § 8(a)(1) of Act if employer
interferes with employee rights under § 7 of Act).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (section 7 of Act states that employees have right to
join, assist or engage in labor unions, bargain collectively and "engage in other concerted
activity"). See generally Mak, supra note 6, at 274 (plain reading of § 7 requires at least two
employees acting together to satisfy requirement of acting in concert); Comment, National
Labor Relations Act Section 7: Protecting Employee Activity Through Implied Concert of
Action, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 813, 819 (1981) (section 7 literally requires at least two employees
acting together to constitute protected concerted activity).
20. See, e.g., Morrison-Knudson Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1966) (section
7 protects concerted employee complaints regarding company's failure to supply employees
with protective goggles and respirators); Southern Oxygen Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 738, 741
(4th Cir. 1954) (group employees' complaints about expense allowance policy is protected
concerted activity within § 7 of NLRA); Hintzee Contracting Co., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (1978)
(employer interfered with employees' protected concerted activities when employer refused to
assign more work to employees demanding higher wages); Lewistown Sportswear, Inc., 213
N.L.R.B. No. 5 (1974) (employees engaged in protected concerted activity when employees
visited director of vocational school to complain about job conditions).
21. See Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1245, 1350 (3d Cir. 1969) (two
employees complaining to management regarding profit sharing plan constitutes protected
concerted activity within § 7), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970); Essex Int'l, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B.
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of employees who act alone.? The disagreement among the NLRB occurs
when an individual employee registers complaints regarding his own working
conditions or the working conditions of his co-workers. 23 In deciding whether
concerted activity under section 7 protects an individual employee's activities,
the Board often has relied on the theory of constructive concerted activity.
24
Under the constructive concerted activity theory, section 7 concerted activ-
ities include not only group activities, but also individual activities when
the activity benefits all employees. 25 In contrast, courts and Boards have
adopted a much narrower interpretation of section 7, holding that section
7 protects employee activity only when two or more employees complain to
management about labor conditions or an individual employee acts on
behalf of a group, intends to induce group activity, or attempts to enforce
a collective bargaining agreement. 26
260, 266 (1974) (three employees at wire manufacturing plant who, complaining to management
regarding condition of work equipment were engaged in protected concerted activity). See
generally Gregory & Mak, Significant Decisions of the NLRB, 1984: The Reagan Board's
'Celebration' of the 50th Anniversary of the National Labor Relations Act, 18 U. CoNN. L.
REv. 7, 49 (1985) (Board and courts have been consistent in applying § 7 protection to legal
activities involving more than one employee).
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (section 7 provides protection to employees engaged in
concerted activity); see also NLRB v. City Disposal 'Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830-31 (1985)
(court should study relationship between employer and employee when addressing § 7 labor
issue). The United States Supreme Court in City Disposal noted that the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act) does not define concerted activity. City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB,
465 U.S. at 830-31. The Court maintained, therefore, that to determine whether particular
individual employee activities constituted concerted activity under section 7 of the Act, a court
must define the type of relationship that existed between the actions of the individual employees
and the actions of other employees. Id.; see Krispy Kreme Doughnut Dorp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d
304, 306 (4th Cor. 1980) (section 7 protection literally requires more than individual participant).
See generally Bethel, supra note 1, at 583 (literal language of § 7 of NLRA protects employees
who act in concert, but language is silent regarding employees acting alone).
23. See Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137,1144
(Sept. 30, 1986) (individual employees' complaints to management regarding condition of
company trucks did not constitute concerted activity); but see Alleluia Cushion Co., 221
N.L.R.B. 999, 1001 (1978) (individual employee's complaints to management regarding unsafe
working conditions did constitute concerted activity), vacated, 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984).
24. See infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing Board decisions applying theory
of constructive concerted activity); infra notes 77-94 and accompanying text (discussing Board's
decision in Alleluia Cushion Co., and application of theory of constructive concerted activity).
25. See Hanson Chevrolet, 237 N.L.R.B. 584, 590 (1978) (individual employee's attempts
to seek salary raise benefits all employees, and thus constitutes protected concerted activity);
Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1351 (1978) (section 7 protects individual employee's
complaints about issues benefitting fellow employees); Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B.
999, 1001 (1975) (individual employee's attempt to enforce statutory right is protected concerted
activity because enforcement of statutory rights benefits all employees).
26. See City Disposal Sys., Inc., v. NLRB, 465 U.S. 822, 831-33 (1985) (individual
employee engages in concerted activity when employee seeks to invoke collectively bargained
right); Mushroom Transp. Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (concerted activity
exists when individual employee acts with intent to initiate, induce, or prepare for group
employee activity); Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. 1137, 1141
1987] 1281
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The conflicting interpretations of concerted activity under section 7 of
the Act are due partly to the failure of the legislature to define concerted
activity.27 The "concerted activity" language first appeared in the Norris-
Laguardia Act of 1931.2 The Norris-Laguardia Act did not protect expressly
concerted employee activities.29 The Norris-Laguardia Act however, did
prohibit the federal courts from enjoining concerted employee activities 0
The Norris-Laguardia Act also endorsed the rights of employees to engage
in concerted activity and collective bargaining." Congress first characterized
concerted activity and collective bargaining as protected rights with the
(Sept. 30, 1986) (concerted activity exists when group of employees complain to management
regarding labor conditions, or single employee acting with group authority complains to
management or seeks to invoke collective bargaining agreement).
27. See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of § 7 of
Act).
28. Norris-Laguardia Act, Ch. 90, §2, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932). Prior to the Norris-
Laguardia Act, the common law prohibited employees engaging in concerted activities such as
strikes and picketing. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 825-26 (1926).
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act) also was a barrier against employees'
concerted activities. See 15 U.S.C. §1 (1964) (conspiracies restraining trade are unlawful). The
Sherman Act declared as unlawful conspiracies that restrained trade or commerce. Id. Although
the Sherman Act sought to eliminate price fixing between manufacturers and suppliers, the
courts also invoked the Sherman Act against labor union activities. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208
U.S. 274, 297 (1908) (discussing coverage of Sherman Act). In Loewe v. Lawlor, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act covered labor union activity. Id. More
specifically, the Loewe Court decided that the concerted activities of unions violated the
Sherman Act when the activities obstructed the flow of an employer's goods in commerce. Id.
at 306; see Mak, supra note 6, at 271 (discussing impact of Sherman Act on employees'
concerted activities).
The first congressional attempt to protect employees' concerted activities came with the
passage of the Clayton Act of 1914. Ch. 323, § 20, 38 stat. 738, 738 (1914). Section 20 of
the Clayton Act attempted to give employees the right to act together without the threat of
an injunction. Id. The Clayton Act's protection of concerted activity became void, however,
when the Supreme Court announced that section 20 of the Act was ineffective as a bar to the
court's issuance of an injunction against concerted activities such as boycotts. See Duplex
Printing Press v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 449 (1921) (section 20 of Clayton Act does not forbid
issuance of injunctions against employee boycotts).
Although the protection of employees under the Clayton Act soon diminished, in 1932
Congress passed the Norris-Laguardia Act which provided that courts could not enforce
injunctions against employees acting in concert. Ch. 90, § 1-15, 47 Stat. 70, 70-71 (1932).
29. Norris-Laguardia Act, Ch. 90, § 1-15, 47 Stat. 70, 70-71 (1932). Although the Norris-
Laguardia Act (the Act) did not expressly protect employees acting together from employer
discharge, the Act stated that employees acting in concert would not be subject to injunctions.
Id. § 4. The Act also stated in section 5 that concerted activity did not constitute unlawful
conspiracy. Id. § 5.
30. See Norris-Laguardia Act, Ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932) (section I of Norris-
Laguardia Act expressly prohibited federal courts from issuing restraining orders or injunctions
in labor dispute cases).
31. See Ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932) (policy statement of § 2 states that employee
who engages in collective bargaining or concerted activity should be free from interference
and restraint of employers).
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passage of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 32 The legislative
history of section 7 of the Act suggests that Congress wanted to protect
the labor movement from the common law prohibition against labor con-
spiracies.3 1 Congress, therefore, afforded protection to employees engaged
in concerted activity or collective bargaining.Y Congress, however, did not
define whether concerted activity under section 7 included acts of an
individual employee nor does the legislative history of the Act explain
whether employees have to act together to gain protection from employer
retaliation.
35
Because Congress did not define whether concerted activity under section
7 of the Act included acts of an individual employee, the major issue that
the courts and the NLRB faced, prior to 1967 therefore was, the relationship
between section 7 concerted activities and individual employee activity.
36
The federal circuit courts and the Board were reluctant to find that concerted
activity existed when an individual employee, acting alone to complain about
working conditions, sought protection under section 7 of the Act. 37 In 1967,
however, the Board, in Interboro Contractors38 found that an employee
acting alone to enforce a collective bargaining agreement could seek pro-
tection under the concerted activity clause of section 7 of the Act.39 In
Interboro, the employer, Interboro Contractors, Incorporated (Interboro)
employed John Landers as a steamfitter. 40 During the course of employment,
Landers made various complaints to management regarding working con-
ditions. 4' Landers' complaints were attempts to enforce provisions in the
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (section 7 of Act protects employees' right to bargain
collectively and engage in concerted activity); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text
(discussing employees' protected rights to engage in collective bargaining and concerted activities
under § 7 of Act).
33. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (discussing history of § 7).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (section 7 of Act protects employees engaging in concerted
activity or collective bargaining).
35. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (discussing failure of history of § 7
and its failure to define scope of concerted activity).
36. Note, The Interboro Doctrine of Constructive Concerted Activity - A Logical
Interpretation of Section 7 of the NLRA or a Legal Fiction?, 7 J. CoRP. L. 75, 80 (1981).
37. See, e.g., Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1963)
(individual employee's complaints to fellow employees that company treated employees unfairly
was not concerted protected activity within § 7); NLRB v. Office Supply Towel Co., 201 F.2d
838, 840 (2d Cir. 1953) (employee's verbal complaints of dissatisfaction with job was not
concerted activity within § 7); Continental Mfg. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 255, 257-58 (1965)
(section 7 did not protect employee's letter to management regarding unsanitary conditions in
restrooms and employee's complaints about unfair supervisors).
38. 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966).
39. Id. at 1298.
40. Id. at 1295.
41. Id. at 1296. In Interboro, management had assigned John Landers a welding job.
Id. Landers complained that he should not work on the welding alone and pointed out that
both the collective bargaining agreement and local city fire regulations require welders to work
in pairs. Id. Landers also complained to management that he had been working without a
partner for the four previous days. Id. Landers also repeatedly requested that management
supply protective leather equipment for the employees. Id. at 1297.
1987i 1283
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
collective bargaining agreement that provided for safe and proper labor
conditions.42 Subsequently, Interboro discharged Landers.4 Landers then
filed unfair labor practice charges against Interboro, alleging that Interboro
violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act for discharging Landers because Landers
had invoked rights that section 7 protected. 44 The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ), however, found that because Landers acted alone and for his own
benefit, section 7 of the Act did not protect Landers' activities. 45 On review,
the Board disagreed with the ALJ and found that the record illustrated that
Landers had acted in concert with two other employees. 46 The Board,
therefore, found that Landers' activities were protected concerted activities
under section 7 of the Act, and that Interboro violated section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by interfering with Landers' exercise of the section 7 rights.47 The
Board also noted that even if Landers actually had acted alone in com-
plaining to management, Landers' activity nevertheless was concerted and,
therefore, protected because the complaints were attempts to enforce the
collective bargaining agreement that affected the rights of all employees.41
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the decision of the Board. 49 The Second Circuit held that activities
of an individual employee that involve attempts to enforce a collective
bargaining agreement are concerted activities under section 7 of the Act
even if fellow employees do not join in the complaint.
50
42. Id. at 1296. The collective bargaining agreement in Interboro that covered steamfitters
required the workmen to work in pairs. Id.
43. Id. at 1298. According to the Administrative Law Judge in Interboro, when John
Landers inquired to the superintendent about his discharge, the superintendent stated that the




47. Id. at 1301-02.
48. Id at 1298. The Board in Interboro relied on a previous Board decision in Bunny
Brothers Construction Company. Id. at 1298 n.4.; see Bunny Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B.
1516, 1519 (1962) (individual employee's attempts to enforce collective bargaining agreement
constitute concerted activity). In Bunny Brothers, Wilkins, an employee of Bunny Brothers,
reported to work and the foreman told Wilkins that the company did not need Wilkins to
drive that day. Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1517 (1962). The foreman,
however, told Wilkins to report Wilkins' show-up pay to the timekeeper. Id. When the company
refused to pay Wilkins his show-up pay, Wilkins complained and the company fired Wilkins.
Id. On review the board noted that the collective bargaining agreement provided that if an
employee showed up for work to drive but the company did not need more drivers, the company
still had to pay the employee for showing up. Id. at 1517-18. the Board held that because Wilkins
sought to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, Wilkins' activity was an
extension of the concerted activity that gave rise to the agreement, and section 7 thus protected
Wilkins. Id. at 1519.
49. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967) (attempts of
individual employee to enforce provisions of collective bargaining agreement constitute protected
concerted activity).
50. Id. at 500. The Second Circuit in Interboro stated that the record illustrated that on
several occasions, John Landers complained on behalf of himself and two other employees.
1284 [Vol. 44:1277
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The NLRB consistently followed the Board's decision in Interboro, while
federal circuit courts split regarding the Interboro decision ( Interboro
doctrine).51 The United States Supreme Court recently resolved the question
of whether an individual employee's assertion of a right contained in a
collective bargaining agreement constituted concerted activity for the pur-
poses of section 7.52 In City Disposal Systems, Inc. v. NLRB53, employee
James Brown refused to drive a truck that Brown thought was unsafe
because of faulty brakes.5 4 Brown neither discussed his complaint with
fellow employees, nor did the fellow employees join with Brown to complain
about the condition of the company trucks.55 Because Brown refused to
Id. at 499-500. The Interboro court followed the Board's reasoning and held that even if
Landers acted for himself, Landers' complaints nevertheless constituted concerted activities
under section 7 of the Act because Landers was attempting to enforce the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 500.
51. See NLRB v. Ben Peking Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 207 (7th Cir. 1971) (employee's
assertion of rights contained in oral agreement between union and employer constituted
concerted activity); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 221 (8th Cir. 1970)
(individual employee's enforcement of rights secured by collective bargaining agreement are
protected rights under § 7 because collective bargaining agreement is result of concerted activity
of employees); Mak, supra note 6, at 267 (although some circuit courts have accepted Interboro,
other circuit courts have rejected or misunderstood doctrine).
In NLRB v. Ben Peking Corp., an employee made disparaging remarks to his supervisor
regarding the employee's compensation. 452 F.2d at 207. The president of Ben Peking,
Corporation (Ben Peking) fired the employee for making the remarks. Id. Although no
collective bargaining agreement was in existence, Ben Peking and the union had an oral
agreement regarding employee compensation. Id. As a result of the oral agreement, the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board) found that the employee engaged in protected
concerted activity. Id. at 205. The Seventh Circuit, relying on Interboro, adopted the findings
of the Board, and held that the employee's remarks constituted concerted activity within
section 7 of the Act. Id at 206-07. But see Royal Dev. Co., Ltd. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 374
(9th Cir. 1983) ( Interboro doctrine is not consistent with express language of Act); Roadway
Express Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687, 694 (lth Cir. 1983) (individual employee's assertion of
right contained in collective bargaining agreement is not concerted activity within § 7); Frank
Briscoe, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting Interboro doctrine).
The National Labor Relations Board has continued to follow Interboro. See, e.g., T & T
Indus. Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 517, 520 (1978) (individual employee's complaints about rights
embodied in labor contract constitute protected concerted activity); Roadway Express, Inc.,
217 N.L.R.B. 278, 279 (1975) (individual employee's assertion of collective bargaining agreement
right is concerted activity because employee is acting in interest of all employees covered by
agreement); C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 911, 911-12 (1971) (same).
52. See City Disposal Sys., Inc., v. NLRB, 465 U.S. 822, 832 (1985) (individual
employee's assertion of rights contained in collective bargaining agreement constitutes concerted
activity).
53. 465 U.S. 822 (1985).
54. See id. at 827. In City Disposal, the employer assigned to each employee a particular
truck that the employee would drive every day. Id. at 826. In May, 1979, employee Brown,
while driving a company truck, almost collided with another employee who was driving truck
number 244. Id. The faulty brakes of truck 244 were the cause of the near collision. Id. Later
in May, Brown's truck was in the repair shop and Brown's supervisor requested that Brown
drive truck 244. Id. at 827. Brown refused to drive truck 244 because of the truck's faulty
brakes. Id.
55. Id. at 827.
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drive the truck, a supervisor of City Disposal Systems, Incorported (City
Disposal) discharged Brown.5 6 As a result of the discharge, Brown filed an
unfair labor practice charge with the Board. 57 The ALJ first noted that the
collective bargaining agreement between City Disposal and the local union,
of which Brown was a member, provided that the employer could not
require the employee to drive an unsafe truck. 8 The ALJ further noted
that the agreement stated that if an employee refused to drive an unsafe
truck, the employee was not in violation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, unless the employee's refusal was unjustified.5 9 The ALJ then found
that Brown was asserting a right under the existing collective bargaining
agreement. 60 The ALJ, therefore, held that City Disposal had interfered
with Brown's protected rights under section 7. 61 In a hearing before the
Board, the Board affirmed the holding of the ALJ.6 2 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, reversed the findings of the
ALJ and the Board, holding that concerted activity exists when an individual
employee asserts rights contained in a collective bargaining agreement that
benefit fellow employees. 63
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and subsequently
reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision.64 The Supreme Court in City Disposal
first reviewed the Interboro doctrine.65 The Supreme Court noted that the
rights contained within a collective bargaining agreement are an integral
part of the negotiation process that gives rise to the agreement, and that
the negotiation of the agreement and subsequent enforcement of the rights
granted by the collective bargaining agreement is one single concerted
56. Id. In City Disposal, employee Brown attempted to return to work. Id. City Disposal,
however, refused to rehire Brown. Id.
57. Id. In City Disposal, before employee Brown filed his complaint with the National
Labor Relations Board, Brown filed a grievance with the union, alleging that the employer
wrongfully fired Brown for refusing to drive an unsafe truck. Id. The union refused to file
Brown's grievance, finding that the grievance lacked merit. Id.
58. Id. at 824-25.
59. Id.
60. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 451, 454 (1981).
61. Id. The Administrative Law Judge in City Disposal noted that whether the truck
actually was safe or unsafe, employee Brown honestly believed that the brakes of the truck
were unsafe. Id. City Disposal's contention that Brown did not exercise any collective bargaining
right because the truck actually was in safe operating condition, therefore, had no merit. Id.
62. Id at 451.
63. City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 683 F.2d 1005, 1007 (6th Cir. 1980). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in City Disposal found that the record failed to
provide any evidence that employee Brown acted on behalf of anyone other than himself. Id.
The City Disposal court noted that Brown did not warn any fellow employees regarding the
unsafe truck. Id.
64. City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 465 U.S. 822 (1983).
65. Id. at 829.; see Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966) (section
7 protects indiviual employee's attempts to enforce provisions of collective bargaining agree-
ment).
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activity.6 The Court thus found that when an employee invokes the rights
of a collective bargaining agreement, the employee is not acting for himself
because the employee also is asserting the rights of fellow employees to
whom the agreement applies. 67 The Supreme Court further stressed that the
Interboro doctrine is consistent with the purpose of the Act, which is to
encourage collective bargaining. 6 The Supreme Court in City Disposal noted
that although the legislative history of section 7 does not express the exact
meaning of concerted activity, the legislative history does not indicate that
Congress intended to withdraw protection from the employee who individ-
ually attempts to enforce rights contained in a collective bargaining agree-
ment.69 The Supreme Court noted that Congress intended to maintain
equality between the employee and employer throughout the process of
collective bargaining.70 The Court found, therefore, that the Interboro
doctrine was consistent with the congressional intent of section 7 of the
Act.7' Finally, the Supreme Court held that an individual employee does
not have to refer explicitly to the collective bargaining agreement when the
employee voices his complaints under section 7.72 The Court reasoned that
requiring an employee to refer specifically to the collective bargaining
agreement is unreasonable because employees involved in employment dis-
putes generally lack sophistication in collective bargaining matters. 7 Apply-
ing the Interboro doctrine to the dispute between Brown and City Disposal,
the Supreme Court in City Disposal held that Brown's refusal to drive a
truck was protected concerted activity within section 7 of the Act because
the refusal was an attempt to enforce the collective bargaining agreement. 74
66. City Disposal 465 U.S. at 831-32. The United States Supreme Court in City Disposal
reasoned that collective bargaining agreements would be fruitless if an individual employee
covered by the agreement was unable to assert the rights within the agreement against his
employer. Id.
67. Id. at 832.
68. Id. at 833.
69. Id. at 834-35.
70. Id. at 835.
71. Id. The Supreme Court in City Disposal reasoned that the Interboro doctrine mitigates
the inequality between the employer and employee in an employment relationship by expanding
the protection of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act to employees who seek to invoke
collective bargaining rights against their employers. Id.
72. Id at 840. The United States Supreme Court in City Disposal held that regardless of
whether the employee's complaint is meritorious, an employee's complaint must be only honest
and reasonable to constitute concerted activity. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 841. The dissent in City Disposal held that the National Labor Relations
Board's (the Board) enforcement of the Interboro doctrine was an exercise of undelegated
legislative power. Id. at 842 (O'Conner, J., dissenting). The dissent first argued that the
Interboro doctrine confers upon the Board the final authority to interpret all contracts and to
resolve contract disputes. Id. at 842-43. The dissent noted that Congress explicitly decided that
enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement is a function of the unions and the courts,
and not a function of the Board. Id. at 843. The dissent conceded that the Board has power
to act on contract matters, but has no authority to create unfair labor claims out of the
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Both Interboro and City Disposal represent the proposition that con-
certed activity exists when an individual employee asserts a right contained
in a collective bargaining agreement. 75 Neither the Second Circuit in Inter-
boro nor the Supreme Court in City Disposal, however, addressed the
question of whether an individual employee's actions ever can constitute
concerted activity within section 7, absent the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement. 76 In Alleluia Cushion Co. 7 7 , the NLRB considered
whether section 7 protected an employee who individually complained to
management regarding the working conditions of all employees when no
collective bargaining agreement was in existence. 78 In Alleluia, Jack Henley,
an employee of Alleluia Cushion Company (Alleluia), complained to man-
agement about the lack of safety equipment and the lack of supervisor
concern in the workplace. 79 Henley neither discussed his complaints with
fellow employees, nor did the fellow employees join in Henley's complaints
to management. 0 Because Alleluia management did not attend to Henley's
complaints, Henley notified the California Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), informing OSHA of Alleluia's safety violations.8'
contract disputes themselves. Id. at 844.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's reasoning that enforcing a right contained in a
collective bargaining agreement is concerted activity because the individual employee's complaint
is an extension of the group interest involved during the negotiation of the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 845. The dissent argued that the majority failed to distinguish between
substantive contract rights and the vindication of the rights. Id. The dissent noted that when
a group of employees together seek enforcement of the collective bargaining rights, the
employees seek vindication through the Board. Id. The Board further noted that the individual
employee asserting collective bargaining rights, although his action falls short of concerted,
may nevertheless seek vindication of his rights through the unions or, if necessary, through
the courts. Id. In both cases, the dissent argued that the union or the Board preserves employee
rights. Id. Finally, the dissent rejected Interboro and held that because Brown did not discuss
the safety of the truck with other employees, nor seek assistance from other employees,
Brown's activity was not concerted activity within the meaning of section 7 of the Act. Id. at
846.
75. See City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 465 U.S. 822, 840 (1985) (individual employee's
invocation of collectively bargained right constitutes concerted activity); Interboro Contractors,
Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966) (individual employee's attempt to enforce provision of
collective bargaining agreement is protected concerted activity); see also supra notes 52-74 and
accompanying text (discussion of City Disposal); supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text
(discussion of Interboro Contractors, Inc.).
76. See City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB 465 U.S. 822, 831-32 (1984) (United States
Supreme Court considered whether individual employee's assertion of collectively bargained
right constituted concerted activity within § 7 of Act); see also Interboro Contractors, Inc.,
157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966) (Board considered whether § 7 protected individual employee's
attempt to enforce provisions of collective bargaining agreement).
77. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
78. Id. at 1001-07.
79. Id. at 999. In Alleluia, employee Henley complained about the lack of instructions
given to employees regarding chemical use, the absence of protective guards on machines, and
the absence of first aid stations and eyewash stations. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. In Alleluia, the management, responding to employee Henley's complaint about
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In response to Henley's complaints, OSHA officials visited the Alleluia
plant and discovered numerous safety and health hazards.8 2 Following the
visit of OSHA officials, Alleluia management discharged Henley.83 Henley
then filed a complaint with the Board, alleging that Alleluia violated section
8(a)(1) of the Act by firing Henley for making complaints to OSHA. 84
Henley further alleged that the complaints were protected concerted activity
under section 7 of the Act."
In a hearing before an ALJ of the Board, the ALJ concluded that
Alleluia did not violate section 8(a)(1) of the Act because Henley had not
engaged in a protected concerted activity within the scope of section 7 of
the Act. 6 The ALJ conceded that although Henley may have been engaged
in conduct that was for the mutual aid and benefit of his fellow employees,
the activity was not concerted.81 The ALJ noted that no collective bargaining
agreement was in force, and Henley did not seek the aid or approval of
his fellow employees in bringing the safety hazards to the attention of
management.88 The ALJ held that because Henley acted solely out of his
individual concern for safety, Henley's acts fell short of protected concerted
activity under section 7 of the Act.89
On review before the Board, the Board members disagreed with the
conclusions of the ALJ and held that Henley's complaints constituted
protected concerted activity within the scope of section 7. 90 The Alleluia
Board reasoned that although Henley acted purely on his own, Henley's
complaints reflected a mutual concern of all Alleluia employees and, thus,
Henley did not need to communicate with his fellow employees regarding
the complaints to management. 9' The Alleluia Board noted that a contrav-
ention of the policy of OSHA would occur in presuming that without an
outward manifestation of fellow employee support, the employees did not
safety, told Henley that because management intended to close the facility, management did





86. Id. at 1007.
87. Id. at 1004. the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in Alleluia noted that section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act contains two elements that the employee must prove to
assert successfully a section 8(a)(1) labor violation. Id. The ALJ stated that the employee not
only must prove that his activities were for the mutual aid and protection of other employees,
but the employee also must prove that he engaged in concerted activities and that management
fired the employee for enagaging in concerted activities. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1001.
91. Id. The Alleluia Board stated that the undisputed facts illustrated that Henley acted
alone, but the lack of communication between Henley and his fellow employees was insufficient
to establish that Henley's fellow employees did not share Henley's interest in safety. Id. at
1000.
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agree with Henley. 92 The Board in Alleluia, therefore, adopted a more
expansive definition of concerted activity and held that when an employee
seeks to enforce a statutory right that benefits all employees, the Board will
find implied consent among fellow employees even in the absence of any
outward manifestation of support by the fellow employees. 93 The Board
thus implied that whenever an employee complains to management regarding
statutory rights that affect all employees, the Board will find concerted
protected activity under section 7 of the Act.94
The Alleluia Board's expansive interpretation of section 7 of the Act
has caused most federal circuit courts to reject the Alleluia holding. 9 In
contrast, the Board usually has applied Alleluia to employment issues
concerning section 7, and in some cases the Board has expanded the Alleluia
holding.96 A recent Board decision addressing the concerted activity issue,
however, expressly overruled the Alleluia decision. 97 In Meyers Industries,
Inc.,9 Kenneth Prill, a truck driver for Meyers Industries, Incorporated
92. Id. The Alleluia Board noted that the public policy that OSHA promoted was safe
and healthy working conditions for employees. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Board in Alleluia stated that the Board will find concerted activity when an
individual seeks to enforce an occupational health statute only on the condition that no
evidence exists that employees disavow the individual employees activities. Id.
95. See, e.g., Ontario Knife Co. v NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1980) (section 7
requires that activity be not only for mutual aid and protection, but activity also must be
concerted); Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1980)
(individual employee action for benefit of fellow employees is not concerted if employee did
not intend to enlist group support); Pelton Casteel Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 30 (7th Cir.
1980) (employees simply sharing concerns that individual employee voiced is insufficient to
constitute concerted activity); ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717-18 (6th Cir. 1979)
(employee must actually, not impliedly, be representing views of fellow employees to find
protection within § 7 of Act).
96. See, e.g., Morten Rosen, 264 N.L.R.B. 1342, 1345 (1982) (complaints voiced by
individual employee that are of concern to fellow employees constitute concerted activity);
Hansen Chevrolet, 237 N.L.R.B. 584, 590 (1978) (individual employee's effort to seek salary
increase is protected concerted activity because issue of salary interests all employees); Steere
Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1351 (1978) (individual employee's protest involving issues
that concern all employees constitutes concerted activity).
In Hansen Chevrolet, Cornelius Suggs (Suggs) was an employee of Hansen Chevrolet
(Hansen). 237 N.L.R.B. at 585. Suggs made complaints to Hansen, contending that Suggs'
salary was inadequate. Id. at 586-87. Subsequently, Hansen discharged Suggs for voicing
complaints. Id. The Board held that Suggs was engaged in protected concerted activity because
his efforts to seek a salary increase would benefit his fellow employees. Id. at 590.
In Steere Dairy, the employer, Steere Dairy, discharged the employee for protesting a
change in work conditions that resulted in lower wages. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1351. The Board in
Steere Dairy, relying on Alleluia, held that although the employee individually protested the
change in working conditions, his protest constituted protected concerted activity because the
protest involved a group employee concern. Id.
97. See Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 496 (1984) (Alleluia is inconsistent with
principles inherent in § 7 of Act); see also infra notes 106-32 and accompanying text (discussing
Board's decision in Meyers Industries, Inc.).
98. 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984)
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(Meyers), complained to management about brake malfunctions in the
company trucks. 99 Later, while driving a truck for Meyers, Prill was involved
in an accident as a result of the truck's faulty brakes. '0 Prill contacted
Meyers to inform management of the accident, and also contacted the local
public service commission to arrange for an inspection of the truck. 01
Meyers subsequently discharged Prill for contacting the local public service
commission, and Prill brought an action against Meyers, claiming that his
dismissal violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act because Prill engaged in con-
certed activities that section 7 protected.' 0 2 The ALJ, relying on Alleluia,
concluded that Meyers violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act because Meyers'
management had discharged Prill for engaging in protected concerted activity
within section 7 of the Act. 03 The Board in Meyers Industries (Meyers 1),
reversed the AL's conclusion and overruled Alleluia, holding that concerted
activity exists only when an employee engages with other employees or acts
on the authority of fellow employees, and not solely on behalf of himself,
to complain about labor conditions or to invoke a statutory right. 104 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit remanded Meyers I so that the Board could reexamine Meyers I in
light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in City Disposal.05
99. Id. at 497.
100. Id.
101. Id. In Meyers, as a result of the inspection, the local public service commission
issued to Prill a citation for operating an unsafe vehicle. Id.
102. Id. at 498. The Administrative Law Judge in Meyers concluded that management
discharged Prill for two reasons. Id. First, the management discharged Prill because Prill
refused to drive the company truck back to the company office after the local public service
commission issued Prill a citation. Id. Second, management discharged Prill because prior to
the collision, Prill had made safety complaints to management and Ohio State inspection
authorities regarding the condition of the company trucks. Id. at 497-98.
103. Id. at 508. The Administrative Law Judge in Meyers followed the rationale of Alleluia
Cushion, Co. and concluded that because Prill made work-related complaints that would
benefit all employees, section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protected Pril's activities.
Id.
104. Id. at 496. The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) in Meyers I first reasoned
that the Board should abandon Alleluia because, prior to the Alleluia decision, the Board
defined concerted activity in terms of group employee interaction. Id. at 494. The Meyers I
Board noted that the Board in Alleluia determined the existence of concerted activities without
any regard to the form of the employee's activity. Id. The Alleluia Board protected individual
activity if the activity involved an issue in which all employees ought to have an interest,
regardless of whether an individual employee voiced the complaint solely for his own benefit.
Id. The Board in Alleluia thus artificially presumed group interaction among employees
whenever an individual employee made safety complaints solely for his own benefit. Id. at
496. The Meyers I Board, in rejecting Alleluia, held that individual activity that should generate
group support, is insufficient to constitute concerted activity within section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, if the activity actually does not generate the necessary group support.
Id.
105. See Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Board did not have benefit
of United States Supreme Court's decision in City Disposal when Board rendered Meyers I
decision). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Prill v.
1987]
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On remand to the Board (Meyers I1), the NLRB chose to reaffirm its
decision in Meyers I that concerted activity exists when an employee engages
with other employees to complain to management regarding working con-
ditions, or when the employee acts on the authority of fellow employees in
complaining.1 ° The Board reasoned that Meyers I is faithful to the purposes
of the Act.10 7 The Board noted that section 7 of the Act has roots in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Wagner Act, both of which emphasize
collective activity as distinguished from individual activity. 08 Meyers I, which
defines concerted activity as some form of group activity, is thus the
reasonable interpretation of section 7 according to the Board in Meyers
I1.09 The Meyers II Board, therefore, reaffirmed the Board's decision in
Meyers I to overrule Alleluia."0
After concluding that the Meyers I definition of concerted activity was
reasonable, the Board then examined whether Meyers I was consistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in City Disposal that an individual employee's
assertion of a right contained in a collective bargaining agreement constitutes
concerted activity."' The Board initially inferred that the overruling of
Alleluia in Meyers I was not an indication that Meyers I was inconsistent
with City Disposal."2 The Meyers II Board first noted that the Alleluia
Board focused on whether an individual employee's action is for the mutual
aid or protection of employees, and if such action is for the mutual aid
and protection, the activity was concerted within section 7 of the Act,
regardless of whether other employees were involved." 3 The Meyers II Board
then noted, however, that prior to Alleluia, the Board recognized that the
NLRB, criticized the decision in Meyers I. 755 F.2d at 953. The Prill court, however, stated
that the court would not offer any particular approach to concerted activity, nor decide
whether the Board's decision in Meyers I was correct. Id. Rather, the Prill Court remanded
the case to the Board so that the Board could reconsider its position in Meyers I in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in City Disposal Systems v. NLRB. Id.
106. Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1138 (Sept.
30, 1986) (Meyers 11).
107. Meyers II, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1138. The National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
in Meyers 11 concluded that the Supreme Court has granted the Board wide discretion in
interpreting section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Id. The Board, however
conceded that the Board must choose a construction that promotes the major purposes of the
Act. Id; see also City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1983) (courts give
considerable deference to Board's reasonable construction of Act).
108. 123 L.R.R.M. at 1138; see supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (discussing
history of National Labor Relations Act).
109. 123 L.R.R.M. at 1138.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1139.
112. Id. at 1139-40. The Meyers I Board overruled Alleluia Cushion Co. because the
Alleluia Board's determination of when section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protected
individual concerted activity depended on whether the activity was for the mutual aid and
protection of fellow employees. Id. at 1140. The Meyers H Board maintained, however, that
employee activity also must meet the "concerted" test of section 7. Id.
113. Id.
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clauses "for the mutual aid and protection" and "concerted activities" were
separate clauses within section 7 of the Act.114 The Board in Meyers 1,
therefore, stated that employees must prove that an activity meets the
requirements of both clauses within section 7 in order to claim the protection
of section 7.115 Accordingly, the Meyers II Board found that the Alleluia
Board incorrectly had focused on only the mutual aid and protection
requirement of section 7 rather than focusing on both the mutual aid and
the concerted activity requirements of section 7.116 Unlike Alleluia, the
Meyers II Board found that the Supreme Court in City Disposal correctly
recognized "concerted activity" and "for the mutual aid and protection"
as two separate clauses of section 7 and, therefore, the Meyers I overruling
of Alleluia is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in City Dis-
posal."7 The Meyers 11 Board did concede, however, that the issue before
the Supreme Court in City Disposal was not the same issue that was before
the Board in Meyers P11 The Meyers 11 Board, however, recognized that
the City Disposal decision offers two guiding principles to the Board that
support the Meyers I Board's overruling of Alleluia."9 First, the Supreme
Court's decision in City Disposal suggests that a definition of concerted
activity should include individual action only when an employee acts as a
representative of a group. 20 Next, the City Disposal decision suggests that
114. Id.
115. Id.; see Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1980) (section 7
protection requires that activity be not only concerted but also for mutual aid and protection
of fellow employees); Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir.
1980) (section 7 protects individual employee activity for mutual aid and protection of fellow
employees if activity is moving towards group action or group enlistment).
116. Meyers II, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1140; see City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 465 U.S.
822, 830-31 (1985) (section 7 protects employee activity that is both concerted and for mutual
aid and protection of other employees).
117. Meyers II, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1140. The Meyers II Board concluded that the Supreme
Court in City Disposal recognized that the core of the concerted activity issue was whether an
employee's action had any type of connection to collective bargaining or group activity of
fellow employees. Id; see City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1981) (existence
of concerted activity depends on whether employee interacts with fellow employees). The
Supreme Court stated in City Disposal that an inquiry into the concerted activity issue requires
a court to determine the exact manner in which an individual employee interacts with his
fellow employees. 465 U.S. at 831.
118. Meyers II, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1140. In City Disposal, the employee alleging section 7
protection was asserting a right contained in a collective bargaining agreement. City Disposal
Sys., Inc. 465 U.S. 822, 825 (1984). The issue in City Disposal was thus whether an individual
employee's complaints regarding rights secured by the collective bargaining agreement constituted
concerted activity within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Id. In
contrast, no collective bargaining agreement existed in Meyers L Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493,
497-98 (1984). The issue before the National Labor Relations Board (the Board), therefore, was
whether an individual employee's complaints to management regarding hazardous working
conditions constituted concerted activity within the meaning of section 7 of the Act. Id.
119. Meyers II, 123 L.R.R.M.. at 1140-41.
120. Id.; see City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1983) (concerted
activity exists when employee intends to induce group activity or acts as representative of
fellow employees).
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the definition of concerted activity should include collective activities as
well. 121
Concluding that the Board's decision in Meyers I was consistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in City Disposal, the Meyers 11 Board next
clarified the Meyers I definition of concerted activity.'2 The Board in
Meyers I held that an employee engages in concerted activity when the
employee joins with fellow employees to complain to management regarding
working conditions, or the employee complains to management on behalf
of his fellow employees, and not on behalf of himself.1 23 The Meyers I
Board, however, noted that the Meyers I definition of concerted activity
does not always preclude individual employee activity.'1' Instead, the Meyers
I definition of concerted activity fully embraces individual employee activity
that is for the purpose of initiating, inducing, or preparing for group
employee action.
25
After clarifying the Meyers I definition of concerted activity, the Board
in Meyers I addressed the question of whether public policy should direct
the Board to reconsider the Alleluia decision and protect purely individual
activity when an individual employee invokes a statutory right that benefits
all employees. 2 6 The Meyers II Board stated that public policy should not
direct a court to protect an individual employee's assertion of a statutory
right. 27 The Meyers II Board reasoned that the relationship between an
121. Meyers II 123 L.R.R.M. at 1141; see supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text
(discussing City Disposal position that individual employee's assertion of collectively bargained
right constitutes concerted activity).
122. Meyers II, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1141.
123. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984).
124. Meyers II, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1141. The Meyers II Board stated that the Meyers I
definition of concerted activity attempts to define the situations in which an individual
employee's acts constitute concerted activity. Id.
125. Id. at 1142. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
in Prill v. NLRB, remanded Meyers I to allow the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
to determine whether the Meyers I definition of concerted activity embraced the widely
accepted standard of concerted activity enunciated in Mushroom Transportation v. NLRB.
Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Mushroom Transportation, the employee,
Keeler, was an extra driver for the employer, Mushroom Transportation. Mushroom Transp.,
Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 684 (3d Cir. 1964). Keeler constantly talked with fellow employees,
advising the employees of their labor rights. Id. The president of Mushroom Transportation,
hearing rumors of Keeler's talk, removed Keeler from the list of extra drivers. Id. The Board
found that Keeler's activities were within the scope of section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, reversed the
Board's decision. Id. at 685. The Mushroom Transportation court conceded that a conversation
between two people may constitute concerted activity if the employee's object is to initiate,
induce, or prepare for some type of group activity. Id. The Second Circuit found no evidence
that group action was the object of Keeler's conversations with fellow employees and conse-
quently held that Keeler's actions were not concerted. Id.
126. Meyers 11, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1143; see supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text
(discussing Alleluia Board's holding that individual employee's invocation of statutory right
that benefits all employees constitutes concerted activity).
127. Meyers 1I, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1143.
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employee's invocation of a statutory right and the workplace is too atten-
uated for the employee's invocation to constitute concerted activity. 2 The
Meyers II Board distinguished an individual employee's invocation of a
statutory right from an employee's invocation of a right grounded in a
collective bargaining agreement by noting that the invocation of a right
grounded in a collective bargaining agreement is part of the ongoing
concerted process of negotiation and administration of the agreement, but
an individual employee's assertion of a statutory right is not part of an
ongoing process. 129 Finally, the Meyers II Board admitted that Congress
intended the Board to be a forum in which to resolve employment injustices
resulting from violations of the Act, but cautioned that the Board does not
possess the power to remedy all immorality and illegality resulting from
employers' violations of federal and state law. 30 Accordingly, the Meyers
11 Board reaffirmed the definition of concerted activity adopted in Meyers
I, and held that Prill acted alone without any intent to draft the support
of his fellow employees .'3  The Board, therefore, determined that Prill's
activity did not constitute section 7 concerted activity.'
32
The NLRB's decisions in Meyers I and Meyers I1 represent the Board's
recent attempts to define concerted activity within the meaning of section
7 of the Act.' 3 Since the Meyers II decision, the Board, in two subsequent
cases, has held that concerted activity exists when employees act together
or when an individual employee seeks to enforce a collective bargaining
agreement or acts on behalf of a group.1M The Board's definition of
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) in Meyers 11 suggested that
employee Prill may have an action against Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers) under state law.
Id. The Board, however, noted that Prill already had filed a complaint under the Michigan
Occupational Safety and Health Act, alleging that Meyers' discharge of Prill violated the
Michigan Act. Id. at 1143 n.4. The Michigan Department of Labor, however, dismissed Prill's
action, finding that Prill failed to establish his burden of proof. Id.
131. Id. at 1144.
132. Id.
133. See Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1141
(Sept. 30, 1986) (concerted activity exists when group of employees complain to management
regarding labor conditions, individual employee acting with group authority complains to
management, or individual employee invokes collective bargaining right); Meyers Indus., Inc.,
268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (same). See generally Finkin & Gorman, supra note 15, at 323
(narrow application of concerted activity exists when employee's activity must be for purpose
of inducing or preparing for group action); Note, The Supreme Court Takes One Step Forward
and the NLRB Takes One Step Backward: Redefining Constructive Concerted Activity, 38
VAND. L. Rv. 1295, 1330 (1985) (Board's definition of concerted activity in Meyers I is
restrictive).
134. See Every Woman's Place, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001, 1001
(Dec. 11, 1986) (refusing to repudiate rationale of Board in Meyers fl); Consumers Power
Co., 282 N.L.R.B. No.24, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1305, 1306 (Nov. 13, 1986) (following Meyers
H definition of concerted activity to determine whether employee was protected by § 7 of
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concerted activity in Meyers I and Meyers II, however, represents a more
narrow definition than the decisions at which the Board arrived in earlier
decisions. 135 The Board's recent swing away from a more inclusive definition
of concerted activity may be a result of the current membership of the
Board. 3 6 Presently, the Board consists entirely of members whom President
Reagan appointed, and the Board's decisions in Meyers I and Meyers I1
are pro-management. 3 7 In contrast, the Board's decisions primarily favored
Act).
In Every Woman's Place, Cathee Doran, an employee of Every Woman's Place, telephoned
the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor to complain about
insufficient wages that she and her fellow employees were receiving from their employer. Every
Woman's Place, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1001. Prior to the telephone call, Doran and two fellow
employees brought the issue of overtime compensation to the attention of their employer on
several occasions. Id. As a result of Doran's actions, the management discharged her. Id. The
National Labor Relations Board (the Board) held that Doran's activities fell within the Meyers
II definition of concerted activity. Id. The Board distinguished Doran's activities from the
activities of the employee in Meyers II, noting that Doran had complained to management
with two fellow employees, while the employee in Meyers I1 registered complaints individually.
Id. Finally, the Board specifically noted that the Board was not returning to the definition of
concerted activity enunciated in Alleluia. Id. at 1002.
In Consumer Power Co., the employer discharged employee Knight for complaining to
the supervisor regarding the employer's failure to provide protection to an employee who
received a threat of violence from a customer. Consumers Power Co., 123 L.R.R.M. at 1305.
The Board maintained that because Knight and another employee approached the supervisor
to complain, Knight's complaints were concerted. Id. at 1306. The Board noted that even if
Knight individually had complained to the supervisor, Knight's complaints nevertheless were
concerted because the activities were a continuation of the concerted safety complaints that
all of the employees voiced at weekly meetings with the employer. Id. The Board, therefore
held that Knight's activities were concerted within the Meyers I definition of concerted
activities because Knight acted on the authority of fellow employees. Id.
135. Compare Meyers Indus., Inc., 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1141 (section 7 protects
employees' activities when group of employees complain to management about working
conditions or single employee complains to management on behalf of group) and Meyers
Indus., Inc. 268 N.L.R.B. at 497 (same) with T & T Indus., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 517, 520
(1978) (individual employee's complaints regarding statutory right constitutes concerted activity)
and Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 99, 1000 (1975) (concerted activity exists when
individual employee invokes statutory right even without authorization from fellow employees).
136. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (effect of Board membership on Board
decisions).
137. See infra note 139 (illustration of Board's contrasting labor positions during different
political administrations). Each of the five National Labor Relations Board members serves
one term of five year with the exception of one member who serves a term of only two years.
29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). The President may appoint a new member to the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) only when a previous member's term expires, and the President
may remove a member from the Board only if the member has neglected his duties to the
Board. Id. The Board presently consists entirely of Reagan appointees. See Morris & Turk, A
Labor Board Roundup and Forecast: The Balance Continues to Shift, 11 EM.PL. REL. L.J. 32,
54-55 (1985). Currently, the Board is pro-management because the Board members share the
philosophy and idealogy of the present conservative Reagan Administration. See 29 U.S.C. §
153(a) (1982) (National Labor Relations Act reserves power in President to appoint Board
members).
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labor when the Board consisted entirely of Democratic appointees. 138 The
present Board's decisions in Meyers I and Meyers II, which demonstrate
pro-management sympathies by restricting the definition of concerted activ-
ity, nevertheless promote the policy of the Act.139 Congress designed labor
laws, such as section 7 of the Act, to encourage employees to act together.
14
0
The policy behind section 7 of the Act is to encourage collective bargaining
and friendly compromises of industrial disputes between employers and
employees regarding labor conditions.' 4' The Board's decisions in Meyers I
and Meyers II, therefore, support the policy behind the labor laws because
the Board's decisions promote group employee activity by affording protec-
tion to employees who act collectively or concertedly. 142 The promotion of
group employee activity not only saves production time and reduces admin-
istrative costs, but also avoids the unnecessary discharge of employees.
43
The Board's decisions in Meyers I and Meyers II which provide section 7
coverage to employees acting together, rather than to a single employee
acting alone, are consistent with, and promote the policy of, collective
activity in the work environment. 44 In contrast, the Board's decisions in
138. See Mak, supra note 6, at 268 n.7. One commentator introduces an example
illustrating the varying labor positions of the Democratic and Republican administrations with
respect to labor issues. Id. During the Eisenhower Administration, the Board in Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp., held that an employer did not violate section 8(a)(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act when the employer failed to bargain with the union regarding a decision
to subcontract maintenance work that employees performed. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 1561 (1961). The following year, after President Kennedy appointed new
members to the Board, the Board reconsidered the Fibreboard decision, and on the same set
of facts, reversed the position of the previous Board. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 138
N.L.R.B. 550, 555 (1962); see Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 494 (1984) ( Meyers I
decision was 2-1 decision, with Member Zimmerman, appointee of President Carter, dissenting).
Commentators have criticized the construction of the Board, arguing that political consid-
erations influence the members' decisions. Fogen, What's Right is Right - Labor Board Should
Not Be Political, 13 LAn. L.J. 1060, 1060 (1962). One commentator asserts that because the
Board members affiliate with different political factions, the Board's decisions that previously
held for management are overruled when a pro-labor administration appoints new Board
members. Id. The commentator also notes that because the President appoints Board members,
the members are likely to share the President's political views. Id.
139. See infra notes 140-44 (discussing favorable policy results of Meyers' decisions)
140. See NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251. 261-62 (1975) (goal of § 7 is to provide all
employees freedom to associate with fellow employees, to self-organize and to designate
employee representatives).
141. See City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 465 U.S. 822, 834 (1983) (policy of Act is to
equalize bargaining power between employer and employee); see also supra note 2 and
accompanying text (discussion of purpose and policy of Act).
142. See Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (section 7 protects employees
engaged in group activity or employees acting on authority of group of employees); Meyers
Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No.118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1141 (same).
143. City Disposal Sys., Inc. V. NLRB, 465 U.S. 822, 844 (1983) (O'Conner, J. dissenting).
144. See Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (section 7 does not protect
individual employees acting to further own interest); Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No.
118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1141 (Sept. 30 1986) (section 7 does not protect employee
acting solely for his own behalf); see also supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (decision
of Meyers II promotes labor policy).
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Alleluia and its progeny stifle the promotion of group employee activity. 45
The Alleluia line of cases, which provides section 7 protection to an
individual employee whose activity benefits fellow employees, fails to pro-
mote interaction among employees.146 Instead, Alleluia allows the Board to
review an employer's actions against an individual employee under the
disguise of protecting an employee's section 7 rights.
47
In contrast to the criticism of Alleluia in the Meyers decisions, supporters
of Alleluia argue that section 7 protects individual employee activity because
Congress intended for section 7 to protect individual employee activity from
employer retaliation.148 The commentators argue that Congress, by expand-
ing protection to employees acting in concert under section 7 of the Act,
could not have intended for section 7 to deprive the same protection from
single employees having the same motive as the group employees.1
49 Com-
mentators contend that a strict Meyers I interpretation of section 7 would
deter individual employees from voicing complaints to management because
section 7 no longer protects the employees' individual activities. 50 Arguably,
a Meyers I construction of concerted activity condones employers who have
discharged individual employees for filing complaints regarding safety, com-
pensation, or other working conditions.'' Furthermore, the opponents of a
145. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (discussion of Alleluia's contravention
of policy of Act); supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (same).
146. See Bethel, supra note 1, at 631 (Alleluia failed to find proper balance between
rights of employers and of employees and underlying policy of National Labor Relations Act);
see also Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1001 (1975) (individual employee's assertion
of statutory right benefitting fellow employees constitutes concerted activity); Hansen Chevrolet,
237 N.L.R.B. 584, 590 (1984) (individual employee's activities that benefit fellow employees
are concerted activities); Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1351 (1978) (section 7 protects
individual employee's complaints regarding issues that should concern fellow employees).
147. Bethel, supra note 1, at 631. Commentators suggest that the Alleluia line of cases
creates concert among employees when no concert actually exists. Id. Further, Alleluia and its
progeny read the requirement of concert out of the National Labor Relations Act. Id.
Commentators thus maintain that the results of the Alleluia interpretation of section 7 allow
the National Labor Relations Board to assess all employer and employee activity under the
pretense of protecting employee rights to act in concert. Id.
148. See Finkin & Gorman, supra note 15, at 344. Commentators maintain that the
history of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) suggests that courts should
use an expansive interpretation of section 7 that would encompass an individual employee's
right to complain and to act in his own self-interest. Id. The commentators reason that
Congress chose to emphasize concerted activity in the Act because concerted employee activity
is controversial. Id. at 345. In contrast, Congress had no need to emphasize individual employee
activity because the protection of individual employees is not controversial, and individual
employee activity is a lesser included activity of concerted activity. Id.
149. See id. at 338 (only anomalous reading of Act would allow discharge of individual
employee protesting mistreatment while prohibiting discharge of employee for making same
protests if accompanied by fellow employee).
150. See Note, supra note 133, at 1332 (employees who are aware of their rights under
Meyers I definition of concerted activity may not file complaints against management for fear
of discharge).
151. Id. at 1338.
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Meyers I definition of concerted activity argue that because Meyers I
represents the position that individual employee activity never constitutes
concerted activity under section 7, the standard is too rigid because situations
exist when an individual employee legitimately acts on behalf of a group." 2
The arguments of opponents to a strict interpretation of concerted
activity suggest that commentators are objecting to the Meyers I Board's
construction of concerted activity, and not the construction of concerted
activity as clarified in Meyers I.'s1 First, the Board in Meyers II specifically
clarified Meyers I, holding that the new construction of concerted activity
does not preclude all individual employee activity from the protection of
section 7 of the Act. 54 Concerted activity under Meyers II includes not only
purely group activity but also individual activity when the employee's
purpose is to induce or to initiate group activity.Y5 Meyers II also recognizes
an individual employee's complaint regarding a collective bargaining agree-
ment to be within the scope of concerted activity. 5 6 Meyers II, therefore,
affords section 7 protection to limited individual employee activity.157 The
Meyers II Board, although precluding purely individual employee activity
from section 7 protection, emphasized that an employee has the option of
recourse against his employer under a common law discharge action. 5
Furthermore, if an individual employee complains to management regarding
a statutory right, like the employee in Alleluia, the employee, although
unprotected by section 7, may proceed against the employer in the federal
courts under the particular statute.15 9 Meyers II, therefore, does not condone
152. See Bethel, supra note 1, at 605 ( Meyers I interpretation of concerted activity
disallows § 7 protection for any individual employee conduct); see also Note, supra note 128,
at 1325 ( Meyers I standard of concerted activity would not protect individual employee's
activity that induces group employee activity).
153. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing commentators arguements
against Meyers 1); see also Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No.118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1137, (Sept. 30 1986). Commentators discussing Meyers have addressed only Meyers I decision
because the Board recently rendered Meyers I1 decision. Id.
154. See Meyers 11, 281 N.L.R.B. No.118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1141 (1986) (noting
that Meyers I attempted to determine when individual employee activity constitutes concerted
activity within meaning of § 7); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing
Meyers II clarification of Meyers I definition of concerted activity).
155. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing Meyers I acceptance of
concerted activity under Mushroom Transportation standard that concerted activity exists when
individual employee intends to induce group employee activity).
156. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text (discussing Meyers 1I acceptance of
concerted activity under City Disposal standard that individual employee engages in concerted
activity when employee asserts right grounded in collective bargaining agreement).
157. See Meyers1, 281 N.L.R.B. No.118, 123 L.R.R.M. 1137, 1140-42 1986) (concerted
activity exists when employee acts to induce or to initiate group activity or asserts right
contained in collective bargaining agreement); see also supra notes 106-32 and accompanying
text (discussing Meyers HI interpretation of concerted activity).
158. Meyers 11, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1139-42; see Note, supra note 128, at 1331-32 (without
protection that Alleluia decision provides, discharged workers still have common law cause of
action for wrongful discharge against employer).
159. See Meyers 11, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1143. The Meyers 11 Board maintained that employee
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the discharge of an employee, but merely states that the Board is not the
forum in which to resolve every conflict that arises between an employer
and employee. 16
Meyers II is consistent with congressional intent because Congress did
not address purely individual rights in section 7 of the Act.' 6 ' Furthermore,
the legislative history discloses that the focus of section 7 of the Act is
collective bargaining and other forms of employee group activity 62 Con-
gress, therefore, may have intended to protect only group activity because
group activity is the most effective means to enforce the complaints of
employees. 16 One commentator notes that expanding the meaning of con-
certed activity to include situations in which an employee acts alone is
contrary to the terms of section 7.16 Not only has Congress expressed in
section 7 of the Act that employee activity should be concerted, but the
Supreme Court in City Disposal also has ruled that an individual employee's
activity must have a relationship to group action to receive section 7
protection. 61 Meyers II, in overruling Alleluia, holds that when an individual
employee acts solely for himself absent any contact with fellow employees,
the individual employee's activity becomes so remotely related to group
activity that section 7 no longer protects the employee's activity.
166
Prill, although unprotected by section 7, could proceed against his employer, alleging a
violation of a state statute. Id. The Board noted that the Surface Transportation Act of 1982
prohibits the discharge of an employee because the employee has filed a complaint regarding
carrier safety. Id. at 1143-44. In Alleluia Cushion Co., the employee had an available remedy
against the employer under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Alleluia Cushion Co.,
221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975); see 29 U.S.C. § 11(c) (1982) (employer may not discharge
employee for filing OSHA claim against employer).
160. See Meyers II, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1143 (employees can resolve some labor disputes in
courts).
161. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (section 7 protects individuals engaged in concerted
activity); see also Bethel, supra note 1, at 602. One commentator suggests that because Congress
created new rights specifically for the benefit of group employee activities, the inference is
strong that section 7 protects only the expressly stated concerted and collective employee
activity. Id.
162. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEois.ATIvE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 8 (1949) (Congress designed §§ 7
and 8 of Act to protect basic rights involved in collective bargaining), see also H.R. RaP. No.
1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEoIsLATIW HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATiONs ACT, 1935 at 8. (1949) (section 7 of NLRA forbids employers to
interfere with employee organization and encourages acceptance of collective bargaining).
163. See generally Mak, supra note 1, at 603 (by protecting group activity, Congress may
have decided that only group activity could further the labor concerns individual of employees).
164. Note, Interboro Revisited: Keeping the Door Open on Alleluia Cushion, 37 LAB.
L.J. 300, 307 (1986).
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (section 7 protects employees engaged in concerted
acitivity or collective bargaining); City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 833 n.10 (1983)
(individual employee's activity is not concerted when activity remotely is related to activities
of fellow employees).
166. See Meyers Indus., Inc. 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1140
(Sept. 30 1986) (section 7 does not protect individual employee acting solely on his own
behalf).
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The Board's decision in Meyers II affords protection to an individual
employee's activity if the employee complains on behalf of a group, if the
employee intends to initiate group employee activity, or if the employee
complains regarding a right contained in a collective bargaining agreement. 167
The Meyers II definition of concerted activity is consistent with the policy
and purposes of section 7, which are to promote interaction among fellow
employees.' 68 The Board and federal courts, therefore, should continue to
follow the Meyers I definition of concerted activity and should protect
only employee activity that has some connection to group employee activ-
ity. 169 The Board's construction of concerted activity in Meyers II is a valid
and logical interpretation of section 7 that clearly satisfies the primary
objectives of the National Labor Relations Act, which are to encourage
employee interaction and to eliminate industrial strife in the labor environ-
ment. 170
LoRI A. CIARROCCA
167. See supra notes 106-32 and accompanying text (discussing Meyers 11 interpretation
of concerted activity).
168. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (discussing Meyers II decision's
consistency with purposes of § 7 of Act).
169. See supra notes 106-32 and accompanying text (discussing Meyers II definition of
concerted activity within § 7 of Act).
170. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text (discussing objectives of § 7 of Act).
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